

## **JERUSALEM IN THE YEAR 2050**

Naseer H. Aruri

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### **The Challenge to the Symposium:**

The challenge to this symposium is to propose a collective effort at envisioning Jerusalem forty-five years hence. We are asked to imagine what would happen if the contending protagonists in the search for harmony in Jerusalem were compelled to recast their competing claims and possible solutions not in the light of questions of competing nations but in light of questions about what might make Jerusalem a “vibrant, democratic and peaceful city;” How to think about the city in and of itself.

Perhaps, a new and an alternative narrative are needed, focusing on what a peaceful, pluralistic, economically viable, and united Jerusalem could and should look like. A definition of Jerusalem is also needed. To some, it is the mere one square mile space surrounded by the historic wall, while to others there is the city of pre-1948, post-1948, post-1967, Municipal Jerusalem, and Metropolitan Jerusalem. For Sharon, there is greater Jerusalem of 124 square miles surrounded by his

apartheid wall and stretching between the Jordan Valley and the Mediterranean.

Which, if any, of these Jerusalem will prevail in the year 2050?

That will depend, of course, on whose world view will prevail by then—that of Washington's neo-conservatives and their Likudist allies, or that of the international civil society, which favors multilateralism, pacific settlement of disputes, and pluralistic existence. It would also determine who the citizens are and what the corresponding boundaries are as well.

We need to find an analytical by-passing of nation-states while encompassing all ethnic and religious groups who people the city. Economic globalization has placed new constraints on the ability of nation-states to control economies, social and cultural dynamics within their own borders. What future designs and visions might make Jerusalem a democratic, vibrant, peaceful and sustainable city by 2050?

The charge also includes looking at the city from the perspective of the city itself and its residents, rather than from that of nation-states or those empowered with state-planning capabilities. Cities cannot function without transportation systems, energy sources, communication lines, sewage, water piping, electrical grid, public libraries, hospitals, playgrounds, community centers, parks, entertainment facilities, and also boundaries. At present, these facilities exist for the benefit of one community while the other remains marginalized, if not totally excluded. Unless

these facilities serve the needs of all residents of the city on an equal basis and without discrimination, Jerusalem will never be the city of its own people.

Mick Dumpers, a Senior Lecturer at Exeter University, who has written extensively on Jerusalem commented that since 1967, when Israel occupied “East Jerusalem,” the neglect of the Palestinian residential areas by both the Israeli Municipality of Jerusalem and the central government led to the virtual absence of basic services, infrastructure development and welfare programs.<sup>1</sup> Amir Cheshin, a former Israeli adviser on Arab affairs, had attempted to wake Israel up to the facts in a recent book: Israel, he says, has already lost the battle for Jerusalem through this ideologically inspired neglect. Palestinian and foreign charitable associations, religious organizations, the PLO and The Jordanian government attempted to fill the vacuum left by the Israeli state.<sup>2</sup> In Palestinian residential areas, the state is visible only through its restrictive planning laws, tools of expropriation of Palestinian lands and its security forces. But before we begin to consider the conceptual framework to help us envision Jerusalem in 2050, a quick historical background of the city is warranted.

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<sup>1</sup> Mick Dumpers, “Jerusalem and the Illusion of Israeli Sovereignty,” Unpublished paper.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

## The Transformation of Jerusalem: A Historical Background

Both Israeli military historian Meir Pa'il and the writer Amos Elon acknowledged the international community's verdict of a *corpus separatum* as a manifestation of Jerusalem's cosmopolitan multi-religious and culturally diverse character. Pa'il writes that Jerusalem was chosen as capital by King David for purely political reasons--its location between the largest Hebrew tribes: "This would enable him to consolidate his status as the King of the entire people of Israel, as opposed to merely the leader of the tribe of Judah..."<sup>3</sup> Jerusalem's real importance, according to Pa'il, lies in the fact that its transformation from "the remote capital city of a small people" into a place of "great political vitality" was "connected exclusively with the growth of the three great monotheistic religions"--Judaism, Christianity and Islam.<sup>4</sup> The United Nations Resolution (181), which proposed the internationalization of Jerusalem in 1947, was an acknowledgment of that reality, and so was the acceptance of internationalization by an overwhelming majority of Jewish leadership, following the first Palestine-Israel war of 1948.

Today's Jewish leadership, however, perceives an urgent need to acquire a mythical status for Jerusalem in order to justify their utilization of the colossal imbalance of power as a historic opportunity for a *fait accompli*. They insist that any political settlement not based on the notion that Jerusalem is the non-negotiable enlarged

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<sup>3</sup> Meir Pa'il. "Challenge For Peace In The Holy City". *New Outlook*. Vol. 34 No. 4, page 40.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

"eternal capital" is no settlement at all. And yet an acceptable and enduring political solution will surely be impeded by a metaphysical definition of the issue.

Israel's expansion of the boundaries of Jerusalem in all directions has been an ongoing process since 1948, intended to create and formalize a "Greater Jerusalem," which parallels the forcible formation of greater Israel. That process involved massive tampering with the city's territorial and demographic character, its historic and cultural legacy, its architectural integrity and its very identity. To accomplish that goal, numerous illegal actions were taken, including annexation, settlement building, ethnic cleansing, house demolitions, and destruction of the communal life of the indigenous Palestinians.

A plethora of subterfuges continued to be enforced in order to restrict Arab population growth, restricting building permits, zoning procedures, residency rights and road construction, while also utilizing zoning procedures toward the same end. All of this has been part and parcel of a systematic attempt to make the city a predominantly Jewish metropolis, and to dwarf its Muslim-Christian-Arab character, thus bringing to an end a long period of religious and ethnic tolerance, co-existence and inclusiveness.

Three distinct phases of this transformation can be discerned since the establishment of Israel in 1948:

**Phase One: 1948-1967-** Israel used its 1948 conquests to consolidate its hold on to the western part of Jerusalem while also extending its jurisdiction to nine Arab villages and neighborhoods, which together made up the bulk of what has become known as West Jerusalem. The Arab villages included Lifta, Deir Yasin, Ein Karem, and Al-Maliha. The urban centers annexed to West Jerusalem were Talbiya, Al-Qatamoun, upper and lower Baqa'a, Mamila, and the Abu-Tour Musrara quarter. Together, the four villages totaled 28,486 donums of land (1 donum equals 1000 sq. meters or roughly one fourth of an acre), 90 percent of which was owned by Palestinian Arabs. By the time of the 1949 armistice, this occupied territory made up the bulk of the 38,000 donums, which became Jewish West Jerusalem. Over 30,000 of the inhabitants of the occupied Arab villages and urban centers around Jerusalem were driven out by force or fled due to the outbreak of violence, several months before 2000 Jews were forced out of the Jewish quarter in the Old City by the Jordanians.<sup>5</sup> Meanwhile, the only Jewish sectors of Jerusalem lost to Jordan in 1948 were Mount Scopus, the Jewish quarter and the Western (Wailing) Wall inside the old city. Jordanian- controlled, East Jerusalem was comprised of a mere 6000 donums of land.

**Phase II: 1967-1997:** Having consolidated its control of West Jerusalem

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<sup>5</sup> Edward Said, "Projecting Jerusalem," *Journal of Palestine Studies*. Vol. XXV No. 1 (Autumn, 1995),p.7

after 1948, Israel used its 1967 conquest as an opportunity to extend its jurisdiction to the Jordanian-ruled East Jerusalem, and to enlarge the boundaries yet another time to add numerous new Arab villages and neighborhoods, which would later become part of a Jewish dominated Greater Jerusalem. More than 25 percent of the area known today as the West Bank was expropriated and incorporated into a newly-created greater Jerusalem. The physical barriers between East and West Jerusalem were removed. The Moghrabi section of the Old City was totally razed, along with its 350 homes and 700 residents, who were subsequently expelled in order to accommodate a new plaza in front of the Western Wall.

Defying U.N. resolutions, the Israeli Knesset adopted three legislative acts on June 27, 28 and 29, 1967, extending Israeli law to the occupied eastern sector of the city and enlarging the municipal boundaries of “united” Jerusalem, which had suddenly grown from 44,000 donums to 108,000 donums (approximately 29,000 acres).

According to Sarah Kaminkar, an Israeli town planner in the Jerusalem municipality, the new land grab constituted 70,500 donums (about 17,500 acres) which had almost doubled what had already been quadrupled in 1948. Israel managed to avoid incorporating about 80,000 Arabs to the population of the

expanded city by not applying its amendment to the Law and Administration Ordinance to the Arab villages of Abu-Dis, Anata, Hizma, Beit Iksa, Beit Hanina, and al-Ram, as well as the Qalandia refugee camp and the neighborhood of Bethany.

To bolster the Zionist dictum of acquiring the land without the people, Israel carried out a general census of the entire newly occupied territory, including Jerusalem on July 25, 1967 and declared that any residents who were away working, visiting relatives or touring were considered absentees, and thus denied their right to reside in the City. This was also applied to the Palestinian civilians who either fled the fighting or were persuaded to board Israeli buses waiting to take them to the Allenby Bridge to make permanent their displacement in Jordan. An estimated 100,000 Palestinians lost their internationally recognized right to belong to their national patrimony.

The processes of dispossession, displacement, dismemberment, disenfranchisement and dispersal, which had been savagely applied to the Palestinians in 1948, were systematically re-enacted after 1967. For Jerusalem and its surroundings, the overarching objective was to create a huge Jewish metropolis that would disrupt the territorial continuity of the West Bank, keep the Arab

population to manageable proportions (30% by the recently revealed government plan) and pre-empt any sovereign existence for the Palestinians there.

To operationalize that imperative, Israel mobilized varied resources and utilized legal gimmickry that would facilitate the passing of Arab land into Jewish ownership, and then making it off limits to Arabs. During the past three decades, more than 33 percent, or about 16 square miles of the expanded Arab East Jerusalem, areas were confiscated. East Jerusalem, which was a mere 4.3 square miles or 4% of all of Jerusalem prior to 1967, is now 48 square miles or 63% of the newly redefined Jerusalem-expanding eleven fold. The land confiscated from the West Bank is now part of a non-negotiable Jerusalem, and is not therefore an issue for discussion if and when the final status negotiations begin.

**Phase III, 1998-present:**

The creation of the “umbrella municipality” on June 25, 1998 has simply formalized what was known as “greater Jerusalem”. Thus with the incorporation of the illegal settlements of Givat Ze‘ev to the north, Ma‘ale Adumim to the East and Betar and Efrata to the South, the jurisdiction of Jerusalem was extended from a territory of 48 square miles to 124 square miles. The new Jewish population thus added, plus the building of hundreds of thousands of apartments for Jews only were designed to accomplish Israel’s demographic balance of 70 percent Jewish majority and a

tolerated Arab minority of less than 30 percent. Such an enterprise, which flies in the face of numerous U.N. resolutions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Convention (1949) and even the Oslo Accords, may last 20, 30 or even 50 years; but it will not last forever. For it is being driven by the engine of power and hegemony.

Ethnic cleansing and apartheid-style living, which have already been discredited in the world, will ultimately crash head on with the norms of universality and humanistic pluralism. It is not likely that the Jewish ideals of tolerance and conciliation will remain alienated for ever from the Israeli political agenda. It is not likely that the Palestinian people will remain reticent in the face of steady conquest proceeding under no-war conditions. The future of Palestine/Israel will be more secure when all the inhabitants of that land, Muslims, Christians and Jews, can feel equal under the law and can co-exist in a society free of population quotas, by-pass roads, and discriminatory legislation—a society which can give dignity to every single human being.

### **Alternative International Systems:**

Given that we have been asked to look at the city 45 years hence, from the vantage point of its people, by-passing the proclivities of nation—states, we now turn to consider alternative international systems, particularly those based on sovereign rights. The paradigm of the national interest, balance of power, and power

politics makes the existing international system rather dysfunctional. Since the emergence of this system in 1648, with the Peace of Westphalia, the concept of sovereignty is invoked by people and nations alike as justification to stop all rational debating of issues relating to morality, equality, justice, tolerance, and other such normative values. Instead, the discourse is governed by the largely value-free rules of the existing international system.

The premise of the existing system, of course, is that politics is the art of the possible, and opting for normative values is a hopelessly naïve endeavor, if not a sign of gullibility and a desperate pursuit of futility. Most of the available studies on the Palestine-Israel conflict, Jerusalem included are placed in the context of power politics, which governs the so-called peace process. The constant reference to a peace process, despite 38 years of continuous failure, is in itself indicative of surrender to power politics and power imbalance. The peace process has enabled the stronger party to impose conditions, dictate terms, and perpetuate the conflict. Such a paradigm is not likely to be more successful in yielding an equitable and enduring arrangement for a future peaceful co-existence than it has been during the past nearly four decades of futility. The so-called peace process, based as it has been, on rejectable solutions and laden with so much gridlock, can never lead the way to peace and justice.

Attributes, such as a pluralist and peaceful Jerusalem, would not be sustainable in a balance of power setting, nor would they be obtainable through the “peace process,” based as it is on the primacy of geo-politics over international law. In fact, this peace process has, over the decades, either ignored long-standing U.N. resolutions on Jerusalem, or deferred the status of the city, designating it as a “final status issue,” tantamount to an undeclared long-term interim arrangement. When and if the final status talks are ever held, it would be impossible to surmount the physical obstacles on the ground in the short-term. After all, they were established for the purpose of blocking a negotiated settlement in the first place in the name of sovereignty.

Sovereignty is the right of states to allocate power and values within their jurisdiction. It includes enhancing the “national interest” and maximizing the interests of its citizens, elites, and all privileged subjects, oftentimes at the expense of the less privileged and the disenfranchised. At the domestic level, sovereignty grants the government supreme authority. Any individual or group that may feel harmed by the government’s decisions will have no recourse to a higher authority.

Sovereignty has been used in various manners in order to justify certain contradictory ends. During the 60s it was used as an ideology by liberation movements attempting to block imperial and colonial penetration. By the 1970s it was used by third world tyrants in order to block the human rights scrutiny.

Currently, the use of the term tends to be more subtle than before in that we hear new concepts such as “humanitarian intervention,” and “failed states.” Thus, the United States and some western powers claim the right of intervention despite sovereignty for the sake of nation-building, spreading “democracy,” forestalling catastrophes, or checking the production of weapons of mass destruction.

In practice, governments tend to invoke sovereign rights in order to bar external powers or international bodies from applying any type of scrutiny that might be needed to protect the human rights of citizens or subjects from abuses by the rulers, or from prosecution by international tribunals.

The annals of recent history are filled with vetoed U.N. resolutions delivered by the U.S. at the behest of Israel, calling for international protection for Jerusalem’s Palestinian residents and other civilians living under military occupation. Similarly, the right of return for Jerusalem citizens, which is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and U.N. General Assembly resolution 194, has been abrogated by Israel.

Sovereignty has enabled the Western powers to create a world order in which the distribution of resources and allocation of values benefited the powerful, making those powers earn the title colonial or imperial. The economic dominance of the Western states brought them military prowess, political influence and diplomatic clout, all of which contributed to inequality, hegemony, underdevelopment, and in

turn, created conflict. Sovereignty has, thus, served to justify relations between individuals and states based on dominance and subordination.

The resulting inequality and power imbalance have been at the root of the Palestine-Israel conflict regarding many issues, including Jerusalem. The existing international system, grounded in state sovereignty, has buttressed a half century long pattern of conflict resolution, which in turn perpetuated an unjust status-quo, making Jerusalem unlivable for a large sector of its population.

While the right to sovereignty for nation-states is one of the core components of international law, so is the right to self-determination. Unfortunately for Palestinian residents of Jerusalem, as well as the entire occupied territories, their right to self-determination, which would be implemented in an independent sovereign state of Palestine, has been vigorously stymied by the balance of power paradigm of the existing international system. It, therefore, becomes essential to look for an alternative paradigm that may elevate the principles of social justice, economic equality and the universality of human rights Vis a Vis the imperatives of geo-politics. Such a paradigm might indeed be found in the World Order Model, which is better suited to deal with the “ought” rather than the “is.” This model has been conceptualized by certain scholars such as Richard Falk (Towards a Just World Order-with S. Kim, Saul Mendlovitz), Rajni Kothari, Robert Johansen, and Samuel

Kim (*The Quest for A Just World Order*).<sup>6</sup> Falk, the leading thinker of this model, outlined a sort of a bill of human rights comprising five categories:

1. Basic human needs—food, housing, health, education.
2. Basic decencies—protection against genocide, vigilante torture, detention, arbitrary arrest.
3. Participatory rights—participation in the process that controls peoples lives, jobs, place of residence, processes shaping norms.
4. Security rights—secure about well-being and survival, national and ecological security.
5. Humane governance.

It is reasonable to assume that these categories have the ability to transcend considerations of national, ethnic, religious, territorial, or other distinctions.

According to this model, there would be no unreasonable classifications in the law, consistent with the 14<sup>th</sup> Amendment to the US Constitution. A universal standard of justice would encompass individual and collective rights—political, economic, social and cultural. The goal of a common struggle would be equal protection under the law in a single unified state based on the illegality of any disparity or classification in protection of the law, the end of group segregation, and its removal from the social, economic and legal fabrics of society. Equality for every single

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<sup>6</sup> Richard Falk et al, *Toward a Just World Order*, Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1982; Samuel S. Kim, *The Quest for a Just World Order*, Boulder, CO. Westview Press, 1984.

human being in Palestine/Israel would be the motto of the new struggle. All of these ideals stand in contrast to aspects of the existing international system and the theory and practice of Zionism or any variant of exclusionary Islamism or narrow Arab nationalism.

### ***SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION?***

In order to “acquire a holistic and integrated conception of global human identity,” as Samuel Kim has put it, we need an inter-disciplinary approach rather than that of world politics and international relations. The World Order paradigm helps us focus on the kind of relationships that would have to be altered if we are to see a more just and humane social order. According to Kim, the principal defining characteristics are “values, norms and structures.” In brief, we need system transformation, which may not be far fetched by 2050, and may in fact be taking place in the Arab Middle East, in Jerusalem, and also in pre- 1948 Palestine. Such occurrence may ironically and unwittingly, be driven by forces which desire transformation the least. Let us look at this possible transformation in the Arab world, Palestine/Israel, and Jerusalem.

#### **1. The Arab States:**

The Arab states may discover that clinging to sovereignty could make them less sovereign in real terms and less secure economically, militarily, and politically.

Standing apart, while guarding a superfluous sovereignty during most of the second half of the past century, was pretty much a function of the cold war between the USSR and the USA. Meanwhile, their own cold war had been largely derived from the dangerous pressure exerted on them by the two superpowers to take sides. The human rights and needs of their citizens were subordinated to geo-strategic considerations extraneous to the region and the welfare of its inhabitants. While regime security was a principal consideration in the major policies espoused by Arab governments, real security from the unsavory regimes and from external aggression was severely neglected and also subjected to the exigencies of the cold war.

It does not require too much imagination to anticipate a system transformation in the Arab world that would make it more responsive to the basic rights and needs of their people as outlined in the World Order model: better access to food, housing, health, education; protection against genocide, vigilante torture, detention, arbitrary arrest; participation in the process that controls peoples lives: jobs, place of residence, processes; and security about well-being and survival, national and ecological security, as well as humane governance.

Moreover, the European evolution towards integration during the past half century could serve as a model for the Arab states, which are more homogeneous, and thus have more reason to embark on the path of amalgamation. The evolution

from the European Economic Community (EEC), to the European Community (EC), to the European Union (EU), and the diligent efforts to establish a single currency, single textbooks for Germany and France, despite a long history of animosity that is no less deeper than that of the Arabs and Israel, could deter the Arab states from the path of separateness. The Arab world has far better reason to pursue the course of assimilation and unification than does Europe. Their common denominators include defense, foreign policy, ecology, social and economic development, human rights, criminal justice, sports, education, language, culture, and tourism, among other issues.

A pattern of integration within the Arab state system is likely to extend to Israel's relations with the Arab world, but the only way such combination can make sense is if it was built on reciprocity and mutuality, rather than the pursuit of hegemony. The regional imperatives for such harmonization are indeed compelling, and could, in the long range lead to an Europeanization of the Middle East.

### **1. A Single State in Palestine/Israel? A Single Jerusalem?**

The "peace process," might prove to have been a contributory agent to a single state in pre-1948 Palestine, and consequently, to a single pluralistic Jerusalem. US accommodation of Israeli settlement policies and creeping annexation over several decades has created facts and conditions that could initially make a bi-national,

multi-ethnic state (leading hopefully to a secular democracy) the only viable resolution, should prevailing policies of apartheid prove unsuccessful.

During the 1990s, Israel and the United States pursued policies, which dealt a crippling blow to the two-state solution, while continuing to pay lip service to the concept of an independent Palestinian state. Ironically, these policies may have unwittingly paved the way to a single pluralistic state for Arabs and Jews in what the former call historic Palestine and the latter call Eretz Israel. This was the vision of the Palestinian national movement up until the mid-1970s, which was abandoned in what was deemed to be a more pragmatic approach, i.e. the two-state solution.

The derailment of the two-state solution was accomplished through the accumulated effect of fruitless diplomatic efforts carried out by numerous US presidents from Nixon to Bush II. By early 2000, almost seven years after the “historic hand shake” the pursuit of a negotiated settlement based on two states has run its course. That project was dealt a severe blow by a colossal imbalance of power between Israel and the Palestinians, by a steady and growing Israelization of American Middle East policy, a vigorous drive of settler colonization, Arab disarray and failure to respond to the Israeli challenge as well as the exigencies of the post-cold war era.

Paradoxically, the Oslo process led to an inevitable conclusion, which its own architects had neither envisaged nor contemplated: that the only viable solution must

be based upon integration, not separation, a pluralistic existence, not exclusion, towards parity, mutuality, common humanity and a common destiny. Ironically, this reality could lay the foundation for a joint Palestinian-Israeli struggle, which would emanate from a realization that the lives of Palestinians and Israelis are inextricably intertwined. There was and remains a common interest in the economy, employment, water distribution, ecology, energy, human rights, and foreign relations.

By the year 2000, a new discourse had already developed regarding a broader social-economic struggle for equal rights, equal citizenship and equal legitimacy within a single Israeli-Palestinian polity. Different versions, either a democratic secular state or a bi-national state, were being viewed by a growing number of people on both sides as the only viable alternative to perpetual conflict.

By the year 2050 it may be witnessed that structural guarantees are essential for the removal of incapacities inflicted on the Palestinians in the three spheres (those living in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, those inside Israel, and those in the far-flung diaspora). No degree of independence or liberation could be meaningful without removing the legal, social, and economic disabilities which set the Palestinians apart and divided them based on the three existing categories. Redress would require a determined systematic and protracted struggle, combining the three segments of the Palestinian people, jointly

with Israeli Jews who wish to be neither masters of another people, nor privileged in an apartheid system, or colonial settlers denying the existence of the indigenous natives of the land, or promoting their disappearance.

By 2050, the lives of Israelis and Palestinians may become so completely intertwined, that there will be no alternative to having to find a way to live together throughout pre-1948 Palestine, and in a pluralistic and much expanded Jerusalem. In order to arrive at this vision, they would need to develop a mainstream political program that would ultimately redefine the Israeli-Palestinian conflict from one over territory and sovereignty to a paradigm of Power sharing and joint responsibility between Palestinian Arabs and Israeli Jews in Jerusalem and throughout historic Palestine in the form of a bi-national and democratic state.

Different versions, either a democratic secular state or a bi-national state, are being viewed by a growing number of people on both sides as the only just and viable alternative to perpetual conflict. On the Palestinian side, the late Edward Said emerged as one of the idea's key champions. He advanced this theme in an interview in 1997:

The whole idea of trying to produce two states is at an end. The Oslo peace process is really in tatters... The lives of Israelis and Palestinians are hopelessly intertwined. There is no way to separate them. You can have fantasy and denial, or put people in ghettos. But in reality there is a common history. So we have to find a way to live together. It may take 50 years. But...the Israeli experience will gradually turn back

towards the world they really live in, the Islamic Arab world. And that can only come through Palestinians.<sup>7</sup>

In an interview with David Barsamian, Said again endorsed secular bi-nationalism, not only as a desirable outcome, but also as a necessary reality, if the two people are not to exterminate each other:

Of course, on the West Bank, the settlers and Palestinians interact, through antipathy and hostility, but physically they're in the same place. This is something that can't be changed by pulling people back to separate boundaries or separate states... Then there is the demographic reality: By the year 2010, there will be demographic parity between the two, Palestinians and Israelis. The South Africans, in a country twenty times bigger than Israel, couldn't for long maintain apartheid. And it is unlikely that a place like Israel-which is surrounded on all sides by Arab states- is going to be able to maintain what, in effect, is a system of apartheid for Palestinians.

So, although a bi-national state now seems like a totally long shot and completely utopian, not to say to many people a crazy idea, it is the one idea that will allow people to live with-and not exterminate-each other.<sup>8</sup>

In fact, demographic parity will arrive, even sooner than Said and other analysts had projected. Other Palestinian intellectuals in the occupied territories, inside Israel and in exile, including Nadim Rouhana, Adel Ghanem, Azmi Bishara, and Adel Samara among others, have envisioned different variants of the single state concept. The future of Jerusalem is, of course, linked to the future of historic Palestine. Azmi

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<sup>7</sup> *Christian Science Monitor* .May 27, 1997.

<sup>8</sup> David Barsamian. "Edward W. Said" *The Progressive*, April 1999, p.35.

Bishara, the outspoken Member of the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) considers Israel as already a de facto bi-national state, albeit without equality for one of the two nationalities-the Arab one. He is presently engaged in a struggle for equal Rights and citizenship inside Israel. Interviewed by MERIP's *Middle East Report*, he said

We cannot sustain our national identity unless we demand equality in Israel. Otherwise, our national identity becomes merely a product of negating forces, that is to say, a negative national identity, or a product of Israel's refusal to accept us. So, if your national identity is created through inequality only, It becomes shaky and negative. We must build our national identity On the positive forces inherent in it. We do not exist only because Israel rejects us.<sup>9</sup>

Other Palestinian intellectuals like Nadim Rouhana perceived the connection between Oslo's failure and the eventuality of a single binational state in all of historic Palestine:

The failure of the Oslo process to yield a viable Palestinian State could lead to the convergence of interests of all segments Of the Palestinian people in calling for a unitary state in Palestine. Indeed the most likely response to the fading hopes For a Palestinian state will be not the acceptance of a bantustan System of government in the West Bank, but the development of a Mainstream political program that redefines the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict from one over territory and sovereignty to a conflict over Power sharing and equality of Palestinian and Jew in historic Palestine in the form of a binational or secular state- the same Issue that the Palestinians in Israel are struggling for.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> "Equal Rights for Arabs in Jewish State: A Goal Unrealizable: An Interview with Azmi Bishara, Knesset Member." MERIP Press Information Note # 12, December 14, 1999.

A number of Israeli thinkers and politicians have also conceived the possibility of the emergence of some kind of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, secular, or bi-national state for reasons that may or may not differ from those which guided their Palestinian counterparts toward integration. Meron Benvenisti captured the dynamic of the relationship between the two people in 1997, when he offered a Belgian model for all of Palestine between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan:

The reality in Eretz Israel is a bi-national one. The reality inside the Green Line is also bi-national...The model which is closest to my heart is that of Belgium. Two people, the Flemings and the Walloons; two regional governments, and one central government....The direction I would prefer is cantonization, the division of Eretz Israel West of the Jordan River, into Jewish and Arab cantons; I want it to be clear that I include the Galilee and the Triangle in this proposal...<sup>11</sup>

More recently, Benvenisti made a link between Sharon's "disengagement plan" of April 2003 and Bush's declarations of support, on the one hand, and the idea of a bi-national state, on the other:

And Ariel Sharon – crowned by victory and convinced that he has unveiled a daring new initiative which will foil all schemes - will be

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<sup>10</sup> Nadim Rouhana, "The Test of Equal Citizenship," *Harvard International Review* 20 (1998) p. 78. In *Seven Roads: Theoretical Options for the Status of the Arabis in Israel*, Rouhana also argued that Israel itself, within the 1967 boundaries, should become a binational state. (Ozacky-Lazar, Adel Ghanem, and Ilan Pappé: GivatHaviva: The Institute for Peace Research, 1999.)

<sup>11</sup> *NEWS FROM WITHIN*, April 1997.

surprised to discover that in Washington he was pushed into embracing an accelerated process of founding the State of Israel as a bi-national state based on Apartheid....But the day will come when believers in this illusion will realize that “separation” is a means to oppress and dominate, and then they will mobilize to dismantle the Apartheid apparatus. The last ones who will consent to abandon the ideal of “separation” and uphold rights will be the Palestinians; but, to some extent, Sharon’s separation plan, and Bush’s declaration, will provoke them. In this way, Sharon’s rhetorical victory is sown with the seeds of its own destruction. The Bantustan plan is now in swing; and the scenario which Sharon so badly wanted to avoid will unfold.<sup>12</sup>

Haim Bresheeth, an Israeli academic, and son of Holocaust survivors, has viewed the single state as the only solution after Israel made sure that the two-state solution was off the practical agenda:

What Chomsky is suggesting [two-state solution] is too little, too late? Not because Palestine rejected this solution, but because Israel did. The Palestinians are not turkeys, and will not vote for Christmas, and the idea that they can be forced into the 16 ghettos is ludicrous. But so also is the idea that Israel will go back to the 1967 borders willingly. The international community bears full responsibility for failing to act when it could. While it is not clear when such an advanced solution of Jews and Arabs living together may materialize, it seems that it is the only one left, as Israel has made damned sure no other solution is allowed even half a chance. The question seems to be: Must we have a bloody showdown, massacres and ethnic cleansing before it emerges? That is a question international society can ill-afford to ignore.<sup>13</sup>

Daniel Gavron, who has been a Zionist for most of his life, writes in his book *“The Other Side of Despair: Jews and Arabs in the Promised Land”* (Rowman &

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<sup>12</sup> Meron Benvenisti, “Founding a bi-national state,” *Ha’aretz*, April 22, 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Haim Bresheeth, “Two States, too Little, too Late,” *Al-Ahram Weekly*, March 14, 2004.  
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/681/op61.htm>

Littlefield), that the only solution, to his mind, that could preserve the Jewish state - partition into two states, Israel and Palestine - is no longer tenable. If Israeli Jews now wish to secure their long-term future in the region, he explains, they must agree to abdicate Jewish sovereignty and move swiftly, while the balance of power still tilts in their favor, to a multiethnic democracy. He wrote:

After 55 years of Jewish sovereignty, the time has come to dissolve the Jewish state and establish, in its place, a single Israeli-Palestinian state... Having reached the conclusion that the territory between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River must be shared, but cannot be sensibly partitioned... we are left with only one alternative: Israeli-Palestinian coexistence in one nation.<sup>14</sup>

The single state in all of pre-1948 Palestine, which we referred to as a type of system transformation, that would inevitably include Jerusalem, is likely to fulfill the criteria of the World Order Model. We will no longer speak about an unavoidable international balance of forces. The structural flaws which led to a crippled Palestinian economy will have disappeared. The numbers game which has characterized the period of the peace process will have come to an end. With sovereignty no longer at the core, the struggle will shift away from grabbing territory, steering attention away from the size of the ghettos and Bantustans to expanding and improving the pool of common services and sharing the basic rights

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<sup>14</sup> Peter Hirschberg, "One State Awakening," Ha'aretz, December 12, 2003  
<http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/370673.html>

delineated by Richard Falk et al: Basic human needs—food, housing, health, education; basic decencies—protection against genocide, vigilante torture, detention, arbitrary arrest; participatory rights—participation in the process that controls peoples lives, jobs, place of residence, processes shaping norms, national and ecological security; and humane governance, all designed to insure the well-being, security and survival of both people.

By 2050, the Wall, known to some as Separation Wall, and to others as the Apartheid Wall, will have been dismantled since its very existence across the city negates the concept of a vibrant, open, democratic and inclusive Jerusalem. In 2005 the Wall had choked off Jerusalem, cutting off 250,000 Arab residents from the West Bank. Together with the building of 3500 residential units in Maale Adumim, the Wall has separated Jerusalem totally from its hinterland, making it cease to be the natural hub of the West Bank. Danny Rubinstein wrote the following about the Wall's effect on March 31, 2005:

The wall, in this case, is not just an obstructive element of separation; it is an Israeli instrument of control. Its existence permits complete Israeli surveillance of the lives of Palestinians, of commercial activity, of services, of society in general.<sup>15</sup>

To realize the type of city the Conference envisions, the model of a binational democratic and secular state with Jerusalem as its capital, under some sort of international supervision would have to be realized. A *corpus separatum*, as

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<sup>15</sup> Danny Rubinstein, "The Battle for the Capital," Ha'aretz, March 31, 2005.

envisioned by the UN Partition Resolution, 181 of 1947, would have to be examined as well in order to secure an international role and protect the universality of Jerusalem.

In conclusion, the disciplinary panelists were presented with three leading questions.

I will cite them and give my answers:

1. What circumstances or conditions in the city – associated with either the past or the present -- hold the greatest potential for a building a better future?

The past history of the City provides a unique legacy of religious tolerance and ethnic cooperation. While the struggles for the city between the Persians and the Byzantines were rather costly for the city and its inhabitants during the Seventh Century AD. In contrast, the Arab conquest following the battle of Yarmouk in 636 ushered in a new and a brighter era. It was punctuated by the Covenant of Omar, the third Caliph, who entered the City in 638 and established new norms and basis for peaceful co-existence.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> The following are excerpts from the Covenant:

In the name of Allah the Merciful, the Compassionate. This is the covenant which Omar Ibn al-Khattab, the servant of Allah, the Commander of the Faithful, grants to the people of Aelia (Bait Al Maqdis--the Holy House). He grants them security of their lives, their possessions, their churches and crosses...they shall have freedom of religion and none shall be molested unless they rise up in a body. They shall pay a tax instead of military service...and those who leave the city shall be safeguarded until they reach their destination...  
(Alistaire Duncan. The Noble Sanctuary: Portrait of A Holy Place In Arab Jerusalem. London: Middle East Archive. 1972. p. 22).

The Covenant can serve as a model for the City in 2050 with its heavy emphasis on religious and ethnic tolerance. Omar Ibn al-Khatab, received a message from the Patriarch of Jerusalem, Sophronius that he would surrender the city but to him alone. Sophronius was terribly haunted by memories only of twenty two years earlier when the Persians wreaked havoc on the city, and he realized that the situation was desperate. By surrendering to the Caliph himself, the Patriarch was hoping to guarantee the survival of the city and its population. It was indeed the first time that the city had been spared destruction by a conqueror. Omar, a tolerant, modest and devout person, set an example for his followers when he declined the Patriarch's invitation to pray with him in the church of the Holy Sepulchre in order not to encourage his followers to turn the church later into a mosque. Moreover, the terms of surrender revealed a rare magnanimity whereby the vanquished safety, property and churches were guaranteed in return for the payment of the Jizya (poll tax).

The Jews-barred by the Byzantines from Jerusalem for all but one day a year-were allowed to live and worship in the city. The Israeli historian Zev Vilnary expressed it this way:

Whenever Jerusalem came under the rule of Christians, Jews were not allowed to stay or live in it. Those Jews who happened to come to the city during their (the Christian) rule were either killed or expelled. On the other hand, whenever the Muslims occupied the city they

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used to call the Jews in, allow them to live inside the city... and they lived in peace.<sup>17</sup>

According to Karen Armstrong, a former nun, and author of *Jerusalem: One City, Three Faiths* (1996), the Muslim Caliph, Omar "had set one of the highest standards for rule in Jerusalem in that he respected the rights of Jews and Christians to live in the city and practice their faiths. Following his example, Muslim rule sustained the most notable period of co-existence among the three faiths in Jerusalem from 638 AD--1039 AD."

The conquest by the crusaders was a sharp contrast to Omar's conquest four and a half centuries earlier. In a New York Times review of Karen Armstrong's book, *One City Three Faiths*, Gustav Niebuhr writes:

In Ms Armstrong's narrative, brutality was a terrible profaning of the holy city, one 'which permanently damaged relations between the three religions of Abraham.' Their [the Crusaders] violence contrasted with Jerusalem's peaceful takeover by Muslims four centuries earlier.

On July 15, 1099, after a month's siege, "the city was subjected to one of the greatest massacres in its tragic history... The carnage lasted two days and threatened even the Christians living in the city. Members of the small Jewish communities were burned in their synagogues. More than 70,000

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<sup>17</sup> Dan Almaghor. "Jerusalem: Daughter of All Generations" *Yediot Aharonot*. January 29, 1993.

Muslim and Jewish civilians were put to the sword. "It was impossible to see without horror that mass of dead," wrote William of Tyre about the massacre. Even the sight of the victors, covered in blood, was an object of terror", he added. It was William of Tyre who expressed great fears in his famous work that a single Muslim prince would reunite the realms of Syria and Egypt and abolish the very name Christian. That prince was to emerge in the person of Salah al - Din al - Ayyubi, who defeated the Franks in the famous battle of Hittin on July 4, 1187 and recaptured Jerusalem for the Muslims three months later. His treatment of Jerusalem represented a sharp contrast to that of its crusader captors in 1099. He treated the civilian population well and offered safe passage. He allowed Christian pilgrims to enter Jerusalem in his treaty with Richard (the Lion-hearted) in 1191. He restored the church of the Holy Sepulcher to the Orthodox church and, keeping with the Caliph Omar's tradition, he allowed the Jews to return to Palestine and gave them freedom of worship. The Spanish-Jewish poet Yehuda al-Harizi, is quoted by A.K. Asali as having described the significance of Salah al-Din's recovery of Jerusalem for Jews in the following words:

In A.D. 1190 God aroused the spirit of the prince of the Israelites (Salah al-Din), a prudent and courageous man, who came with his entire army, besieged Jerusalem, took it and had it proclaimed throughout the country that he would receive and accept the entire race of Ephraim (the Jews), wherever they came from... we now live here in the

shadow of peace.<sup>18</sup>

Fear of the Crusaders' return prompted Salah al-Din to undertake a more predominant Islamization of the city than the Caliph Omar, but he made the city accessible to the three religious communities, and a renaissance continued through the Mamluke period.

The Covenant of Omar and the initiatives of Salah al-Din stand in contrast to what the Crusades did to the city during the 12<sup>th</sup> Century and what Zionism did to it during the latter half of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the early part of the 21<sup>st</sup> centuries.

John Rose wrote the following in the *Guardian* on this subject:

It is worth reminding ourselves that it was the European Crusaders who slaughtered the Jews (as well as Muslims, of course) in Jerusalem, and it was Saladin who invited them to return. But most Jews had no intention of living in Jerusalem. It was a religious and spiritual centre, not a "homeland". The communities felt "at home" in villages, towns and cities throughout the Islamic world.

Jews migrated from Europe to the Islamic world to escape the Crusades. ...According to Goitein, Islamic authorities made no attempt to impede this migration. What a contrast with our contemporary "civilised" attitudes to migration.<sup>19</sup>

In 2050, Jerusalem could benefit immensely from a modern Covenant that would espouse the basic principles of Omar's document, drawn under international auspices and guaranteed by principles of international law.

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<sup>18</sup> A. K. Asali. "Jerusalem In History." Arab Studies Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Fall 1994).

<sup>19</sup> John Rose, "We need a post-Zionist leap of faith,": Guardian, April 2, 2005.

2. If you were to construct a mutually inclusive project for the city that would accommodate all residents (which may or may not entail the dismantling of “boundaries”) where and on what scale would you begin?

At the political level, a city council representing Palestinians and Israelis on equal basis with rotating chairmanship would be established. It would assign a special importance for protecting the architectural integrity of the city and insuring that the zoning laws which are designed to facilitate ethnic cleansing of Palestinian Arabs would be replaced by zoning ordinances meant to keep the skyline of Jerusalem consistent with its history and cultural legacy. No high rise buildings would be permitted, and no demolition of historic quarters would be allowed under any circumstances. The destruction of the Moghrabi quarter should never be repeated.

At the economic level, the city would be rid of the apartheid highways and the system of tunnels and bridges designed to separate Arabs from Israelis. It would be open to investment by Palestinians, Arabs, and Jews with equal access. Cultural activities and programs focusing on the holidays of the three monotheistic religions and other secular dimensions of Jerusalem would be established to attract tourists from all over the world.

The city would have new major universities and high schools unique to Jerusalem. They would be open to Palestinians and Israelis. The languages of instruction would be English, Arabic and Hebrew. A special curriculum would feature religious studies, archaeology, architecture, tourism, hostelry, computer science and other disciplines that would promote the new, open, and inclusive Jerusalem.

- 3 Which resources and transformations in existent institutions, relationships, and conditions (be they urban, national, or even international) would most enable the proposal you have in mind?

The international character of Jerusalem is perhaps its most valuable asset. Under peace conditions, this character would be expected to generate tourist revenue unhampered by conflict and tensions. Moreover, international agencies and NGOs which have a vested interest in a vibrant, inclusive, and prosperous Jerusalem would be most generous with aid to support the building of civil society institutions without discrimination, and to consolidate the city's international character.

It was that deep concern to maintain that international character which impelled broad segments of the world community to shun Israel's invitation to participate in the "Jerusalem 3000" extravaganza. The Vatican, Britain, the European Union

and many other countries refused to join. Even the U.S. Ambassador of the United States, Martin Indyk, known for his pro-Israel sympathy, was given instructions to not participate; although, he managed to attend the "tourist" aspects of the celebration. The Middle East Council of Churches issued a press release decrying the affront to pluralism:

Jerusalem 3000 is a political statement that marches in locked step with other Israeli efforts to assert sovereignty, de-Christianize the city, and alienate Jerusalem from its Palestinian citizens and its pluralist religious heritage.

The need for a multi-national, multi-cultural solution in Jerusalem has been and will continue to be recognized by the holding of international gatherings and conferences seeking inclusive solutions, not only at the level of governments and international agencies, but also at the level of global civil society.

