

MIT Visions in Progress

1. Why is it so difficult to negotiate the terrain between present and future, between practical action and utopian vision?

Our thoughts on this are as following:

- A. The problems of contemporary Jerusalem cast a heavy shadow on our thinking and on hinder our ability to envisage the distant future outside of the context of the current, complex realities.

- B. Due to recent events (whether it be outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987 and its manifestations in Jerusalem, the 1991 Madrid peace conference which first included an unofficial Palestinian Jerusalem delegation, the Oslo agreements, the breakthrough/stalemate on Jerusalem in final status negotiations in 2000-2001, the second Intifada that primarily targeted Jerusalem, or the Wall being built by the Sharon government), Israelis and Palestinians have been compelled to undergo a painful disavowal of once fundamental beliefs. These strong beliefs, individual and collective alike, had almost the axiomatic status, whether “the united/indivisible Jerusalem”, “the Open-City Jerusalem”, “the full Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders”, the Corpus Separatum”, “the Special Regime in Jerusalem”, etc. The short shelf-lives of yesterday’s perceived realities and utopias make it very difficult to envisage the utopia of the day after tomorrow.

2. How might paying closer attention to the trade-offs involved in scaling over time eventually lead to a better understanding of the limits to and possibilities for peace in the city?

We must be attentive to the two core dimensions of Jerusalem: the mundane terrestrial city, which factors in its residents’ concerns and patterns of life, and the symbol/narrative laden global city. Ignoring either can be done only at peril to the sustainability of any possible future arrangement in the city.

3. Difficulties of the visioning; thoughts that were lying below the surface of our conference but did not have proper time or sufficient venues for airing.

In our view the following are immutable, inter-related realities in Jerusalem that no credible vision is at liberty to ignore:

- A. At its core, Jerusalem is not a multi-religious or a multi-cultural city, but rather a bi-national city, and it is through this bi-national force field that the multi-cultural, multi-religious elements must pass. There are two cities in Jerusalem, one Jewish-Israeli and the other Arab-Palestinian. They stand back to back, facing their different, respective hinterlands. Different types of borders divide the two cities, and turn each of them into a frontier city. Even after achieving an Israeli – Palestinian peace treaty each will border on the other. The intimate proximity of two urban realities dictates that the competition between the two will be transformed in 2020, and even more so in 2050, but hardly disappear.

- B. Under no circumstances can both cities become normal cities, just urban entities like any other city worldwide. As “reality-focussed” as one must be, the symbols and narratives unique to Jerusalem form an integral part of its “realia”.

- C. Jerusalem is an icon not only for its residents or for the two nations struggling to establish hegemony over her, but also the hundreds of millions of the three monotheistic religion’s faithful. Each of them resides symbolically in Jerusalem and is ready to defend the city against the ‘other’. As a frontier city and an icon, always there presence of an ‘other’ who threatens ‘us’ is a constant. Consequently, Jerusalem’s sanctity enhances the city’s “frontier” status, and elevates it. Holiness and geography conspire to preserve both “Jeruselems” as edge cities. It becomes a place where the terrestrial materialism of the urban fabric is interwoven with the powerfully symbolic, be it political,

or spiritual, begins. Jerusalem will remain a place of pilgrimage and ceremony, no mere place of residence.

- 4. What are the assumptions about larger contexts (regional, national, international) that must be addressed in order to imagine a peaceful, democratic, vibrant Jerusalem in 2050; and to what extent should we expect (or require) the act of visioning the city's future to be tied to particular assumptions about these larger institutions and actors, which ones, and why or why not?**

One of us was a principal negotiator of the Geneva Accords, and remains committed to them. For more details, see the text and maps can be seen at <http://www.geneva-accord.org/Accord.aspx?FolderID=33&lang=en>, and “Vision 2 in the appendix of this paper). The other author shares the belief that the principle laid down in the Geneva understandings are so rooted in current and anticipated realities as to have the stamp of inevitability.

We are both, however, aware that further professional work is needed, not only to complete the “missing” appendices of the Geneva Model Agreement, but to amend and update some of its substance. This agreement is not perfect. Some of the Jerusalem related understandings were products of a compromise reflecting the limits of the two negotiating teams at the time when the negotiations were concluded. In the future, and in a different framework, better professional solutions should be suggested within the framework that the Geneva Agreement lied down.

We wish to emphasize that the parameters laid down in the Geneva understandings are not our vision of Jerusalem. It is, rather, the sine qua non vantage point from which one may commence a sober attempt to envision Jerusalem in 2050. Geneva is not “end-game”, but rather the creations of radically new interactions of the territorial sovereignty, looking beyond Geneva will in all likelihood transcend these patterns, with varying elements of trans-national, meta-sovereign realities emerging.

- 5. Likely future for the city *if no alternative visions were offered or enabled*, formulating a model of what the city would look like in 2050 if current conditions continued unchecked.**

We fully anticipate that under such circumstances, Jerusalem will resemble Belfast at its worst, or to invoke a more local image: Jerusalem will be “Hebronized”. Simmering national conflict between the numerically equal national combatants will periodically erupt into convulsive violence. Alternatively, should Israel succeed in destroying fabric of the Palestinian metropolitan area, detaching East Jerusalem from its natural hinterland, daily life inside this artificial city will require heavy-handed Israeli control, periodically sparking violent protests, socio-economically motivated on occasion, nationally motivated at other times. Between these waves of violent protests, the Jewish neighborhoods will be exposed to growing and chronic criminality that is endemic among the deprived, disaffected and disenfranchised.

- 6. How to Proceed Next: *which of these activities appeals to you most, and why (or why not)* - visions to the competition, providing on-the-ground material and information, research and program developments collaborative projects, youth, joint class or studio, website.**

Menachem’s Interests:

Visions – if it is well defined, for instance to the design and management of border [=in the broader definition of the term] areas and interaction places or to border regimes.

Exchange of information and assessments – It may be helpful on annual base, every second year in Jerusalem. Participants – MIT and other Cambridge universities experts, Israeli and Palestinian experts on Jerusalem. During these meetings the participants can give public seminars/presentations and youth classes. In such case the meeting will last a week – enough time to have public presentations, closed doors discussions and touring the cities.

Danny’s Interests:

Help frame the terms of reference of the competition so that it be sufficiently rooted in reality in ways that will not place blinders on the participants. This may well transcend the actual drawing up the terms of the competition, and require a shared learning process for all potential participants, be it by seminars, workshops

or more “virtual” methods. Without these shared terms of reference, I fear the proposals will aspire to the stratospheric, if not messianic.

As to the second “track” regarding collaborative efforts, both Menachem and myself are intimately engaged in an Israeli NGO, Ir Amim, which is already engaged in such collaborative efforts here in Jerusalem, so any MIT initiative in this regard would fit us like a glove. (You can perhaps learn more from our fledgling website, <http://www.ir-amim.org.il>, and I am further attaching the only jointly authored report on the Palestinian elections, co-authored with our Palestinian partner, the “Peace and Democracy Forum”).

7. More information about what programs and activities you are currently engaged in, and might like to bring to our attention or solicit collaboration or assistance from MIT.

Menachem:

As a researcher of Jerusalem I look forward to learn from MIT experts on other urban spaces in order to improve my comparative study of Jerusalem and other divided cities.

Danny:

Monitoring developments that impact on the stability, the equitability and the sustainability of Jerusalem here and now, focussing on those which will negatively impact on future political arrangements; **education**, i.e. exposing decision-makers, opinion-shapers and the relevant publics to the complexities of Jerusalem; **advocacy**, i.e. interventions - legal and within the domestic and international arenas - in an attempt to thwart negative developments; **creating new interactions between Israelis and Palestinians in Jerusalem** i.e. eye-level joint projects with Palestinian civil society organizations in the fields of community empowerment, statutory planning, education, elections, networking etc.; the penultimate Jerusalem, i.e. developing methodologies geared to bridge the chasm between the currently impossible political impasse and the (hopefully) inevitable historic resolution of the conflict in Jerusalem.

Appendixes

Vision 1: from Menachem Klein, **The Jerusalem Problem: the Struggle for Permanent Status**, Gainesville; the university press of florida, 2003, pp. 181-187. Try to imagine this: A Palestinian municipality is operating in Arab East Jerusalem. The Israeli municipality is no longer responsible for the affairs of East Jerusalem's Arab neighborhoods. The school system is Arab, as are the health, legal, water, and road systems, gardening services, and tourism affairs. Israeli drivers receive parking tickets from the al-Quds municipality. The change is largely symbolic, but it's a slap in the face for Israelis. There are emblems of Palestinian sovereignty and administration all over the place. The language used to run the city is different. The dominant colors are those of the Palestinian flag. Public ceremonies and the calendar are also Palestinian. Palestinian sounds and hues replace the thin but salient Israeli veneer that now covers Arab Jerusalem. Palestinian policemen direct traffic. They give out orders to Israeli drivers and reprimand Israeli cab drivers from Jewish Jerusalem who cause traffic jams by letting out tourists on Sultan Suleiman Street. Al-Quds University moves from the suburbs into the center of the city and becomes a national symbol as well as an institution of higher education. It competes both with the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the Palestinians' own Bir Zeit University outside Ramallah.

The Temple Mount is administered by the Palestinian state Waqf. This is brought home by the Waqf uniforms and assertiveness of the officials there, and their pride had having liberated the site from "the claws of occupation." The Temple Mount becomes the main focus of Palestinian national and religious identity. In order to enhance his political and personal status, as well as that of the State of Palestine, Arafat makes a point of officially receiving every visiting head of state on al-Haram al-Sharif. During their visits he also accompanies them on a visit to Christian holy sites. The Palestinian parliament sits in Abu-Dis, and one of the president's offices is located in the Old City's Muslim Quarter, next to al-Haram al-Sharif. A huge wave of Arab and Muslim heads of state come to visit the new country and pray at its Islamic holy sites. The speeches made at these ceremonies reek of national pathos and hostility to the previous Israeli regime. In the early years of Palestinian independence

a special emphasis is placed on the liberation. Contrast with the recent past is at the center of public life. The future seems new and promising and papers over the dreariness of normal, non-revolutionary life, something the Palestinians have trouble coping with.

Even in the past the average Israeli did not move freely through the eastern city. The Intifada dictated a geography of fear and prevented him from strolling through the Muslim Quarter's narrow roads. Then, however, he was the one deciding not to visit those places, while now he thinks he's prevented from doing so because the Palestinians don't want him to. Even in those parts of Arab Jerusalem he feels free to visit, the Israeli visitor must take into account Palestinian law and the special arrangements that prevail there. What happens if he or his car gets hit by a Palestinian driver? Still, Israelis have unimpeded access to the Western Wall and the Mount of Olives via sovereign Israeli territory. Israeli policemen guard the route and are stationed at these holy sites.

The establishment of the State of Palestine, with al-Quds as its capital, has ended East Jerusalem's isolation. Many Palestinians come to visit the city. Most of them have not been there for years. For others, especially the Gazans, this is their first visit ever. The influx of national and religious pilgrims is especially notable during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan and on other Islamic holidays. These crowds of visitors create traffic jams on the binational roads — Route 1, which leads from the Old City walls to the city's north; Hebron Road, from the Old City to Jerusalem's southern entrance, near Bethlehem; the eastern ring road and the road from Ma'aleh Adumim to Jerusalem. Israel has instituted special security arrangements in Jewish Jerusalem and on the city's boundaries, in order to prevent the visitors to al-Quds from Palestine and from other countries from entering Israel freely.

Israeli Jerusalem has always been unique among the country's cities, and this uniqueness is enhanced after the permanent settlement. Before the settlement the difference was attributed to the conflict and tension that prevailed there. Yet it is now clear that the settlement has not turned Israeli Jerusalem into just another Israeli city.

The establishment of the Palestinian capital has removed all obstacles to Palestinian construction. The Palestinians make a special effort to make up for lost time in housing construction. Construction and development accelerate in the neighborhoods distant from the city's historical and religious center. Multistory buildings are being built to the north of al-Quds, like those built since 1996 in

Ramallah and al-Bireh. A contiguous Palestinian urban area stretches from Bethlehem in the south to Ramallah and al-Bireh in the north, skirting to the east the Jewish neighborhoods of Tzameret HaBirah, Pisgat Ze'ev, and Neveh Ya'akov. A similar process takes place in the south. Abu-Dis and Sur Baher join up with Bethlehem, surrounding the Jewish neighborhood of Har Homa on three sides. Israel has trouble getting people to move to Har Homa, and there are those who call for the country to cancel future construction plans there. Kalandia, formerly Atarot, airport reopens, providing at first air service between Palestine and Jordan.

Al-Quds becomes a center of employment and a source of income and attracts Palestinian internal immigration. It's not only the building trades that are providing new employment opportunities — there is also tourism, the Palestinian civil service, and small businesses. The establishment of embassies and consulates in the Palestinian capital makes northern al-Quds desirable and exclusive. The momentum of Palestinian development and migration into the city raise fears among the Israelis. They remember that they for years ran a demographic race with the Palestinians in Jerusalem, and one of their major motives for reaching a permanent settlement was the matter of demography. “Don't the Palestinians intend to change the city's identity by encouraging migration to it?” they ask themselves.

The Jewish neighborhoods built in the eastern part of the city after 1967 are recognized as part of West Jerusalem. This includes the Jewish Quarter, which has been expanded slightly to include Jewish-owned homes in the Armenian Quarter. It also includes the road running just inside the city wall that leads from the Jaffa Gate, which points to Jewish Jerusalem, to the Jewish Quarter and from there to the Dung Gate, which points to the Western Wall.

The Israeli settlers remaining in Ras al-'Amud, Sheikh Jarah, the Muslim Quarter, and Silwan have tense relations with their Arab neighbors and the Palestinian municipality. The settlers are subject to harassment and severe treatment from those who for years had wanted to act against them but could not. Previously the settlers were arrogant and condescending; now it is the Palestinians. The political settlement allowed the settlers to remain Israeli citizens while living in Arab neighborhoods, but they are anomalies in the municipal fabric. Jerusalem is divided into ethnic-national units. The atmosphere in East Jerusalem is not national-liberal and pluralistic to the point of being reconciled with having Israeli settlers living in Palestinian neighborhoods. Some of the settlers are obliged to leave, others continue to run the

seminaries and synagogues established there without actually living in the Arab neighborhood. A small extremist minority insists on remaining and their presence rankles the Palestinians. On the other side, Israel is having to cope with the demands of some Jerusalem Arabs who want to live in the Jewish part of the city in homes they owned before the 1948 war. This problem is more acute than it is in other Israeli cities because the entire city space is open and there is geographical proximity between the West Jerusalem homes these Palestinians are demanding and their current residences in East Jerusalem.

The political settlement has not resolved East Jerusalem's social problems. The establishment of the embassies and the arrival of waves of tourists, and the resulting cosmopolitan and international atmosphere, have intensified the tension between Jerusalem's sanctity and its attraction for foreign visitors. Furthermore, the social and economic gap between the Sho'afat refugee camp and the wealthy Sheikh Jarah neighborhood has grown. The social, economic, and political elite is the main beneficiary of the building boom, economic development, tourism, and the arrival of embassies in the Palestinian capital. The less well off get only what's left over. In other places the disadvantaged find their solace in radical religion. A similar process is underway in Israeli Jerusalem.

Two social groups come into being in al-Quds. One is that of new arrivals, the second, that of the residents of East Jerusalem who, under Israeli rule, bore Israeli identity cards and thus enjoyed freedom of movement and Israeli social benefits. In order to ease East Jerusalem's social plight, Israel has agreed that the residents of the Arab city will continue to enjoy freedom of movement in the Israeli city and will continue to receive social security payments and benefit from Israeli national health insurance. This is, however, a temporary measure, since these beneficiaries are not Israeli citizens and do not vote in elections to the Israeli municipality. The special arrangement makes West Jerusalem hospital services available to the residents of East Jerusalem, and East Jerusalem medical and support professionals can work in the hospitals on the Jewish side of the city.

The city is not divided physically by a wall, but it is quite obvious who is in charge and where. It's obvious because it's important to both sides that it be so. Israel's municipal and national administration must coordinate a number of his activities with a Palestinian administration that does not view itself as inferior to its Israeli counterpart in any way. A metropolitan coordinating committee has begun to

deal with joint problems such as infrastructure (electricity, water, communications, major roads), metropolitan planning, water reservoirs, environmental quality, jurisdiction, and employment. The two bureaucracies have trouble getting used to each other. The Palestinian system isn't run efficiently and suffers from lack of coordination between its different branches; furthermore, personal loyalties are more important on the Palestinian side than institutional ones, both on the municipal and national levels. Sometimes a Palestinian official takes it upon himself to demonstrate to the Israelis that things are not as they once were, and that the Palestinian side has power. This makes it difficult to work together. But the Israeli side also has trouble cooperating. Not long ago the Palestinians were its subjects, and now Israeli officials must treat them as equals. Moreover, it is hard for the Israeli side to accept that decisions made, or not made, by the Palestinians have implications for West Jerusalem. In the past the Israeli administration decided when, for whose benefit, and to what extent it would operate in East Jerusalem. Israel's decisions not to act in certain areas had in fact left many vacuums in East Jerusalem, vacuums the Palestinian Authority filled cautiously and partially. In other words, the failure is also an Israeli one. Israel must now accustom itself to a different situation, one in which the Palestinian side has a status equal to that of the Israel side and can directly affect the Israeli side through its actions, or lack of action, because the two cities are open to each other.

Unlike the other West Bank cities that the Palestinian Authority took charge of gradually in the years 1994-1996, its entry into Jerusalem was hesitant and was on occasion blocked by Israel. Al-Quds never existed before as a Palestinian administrative-municipal unit subordinate to a central Palestinian government. In the period of the British Mandate there was a Jewish-Arab municipal government headed by a Palestinian. In the Jordanian period, the Palestinian municipality was subject to the central government in Amman. More than a generation has gone by since Israel's dissolution of the Jordanian-Palestinian municipal government in 1967. The Palestinian national and local establishment has had difficulty going all at once from a situation in which it has no municipal institutions to a situation in which they exist and function properly, both representatively and as provisioners of services and infrastructure to the local population. The Palestinian population is also having a hard time getting used to the new situation. As much as they admire their national achievement, on the personal level they are apprehensive about the Palestinian central

government's mode of operation. Years of living at the margins of the social and political systems in the West Bank and in Israel, and a high level of exposure to Israeli norms, have had their affect. For many years the Palestinians of East Jerusalem specialized in maneuvering between the Palestinian and Israeli systems in order to survive as a unique social and political entity. They have lived in a frontier city for more than a generation, on the margins of the West Bank's social and political system. It is hard for this population to become accustomed to a reality in which it must govern itself and construct its own governing institutions. It is also difficult for it to accept the authority of the central government. But the central power does not give in. The establishment of al-Quds as the capital means that the Palestinian regime has moved in and established its authority. The central authority wants to turn Jerusalem from a frontier city into a center of national life.

It's not only East Jerusalem that has changed in the wake of the settlement. With foreign embassies moving from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the Israeli capital has taken on a universal and cosmopolitan character and tourists have again appeared in the city. As a city whose economy and income is based on services and tourism, the settlement has given West Jerusalem a big push forward. Since West Jerusalem is open to the eastern side of the city, it has become attractive to tourists, who can enjoy the west side's more numerous and better hotels. Taxi drivers, restaurateurs, and tour guides are up to their necks in work, the exact opposite of the situation that had prevailed since the beginning of the Intifada in 2000. Jerusalem's status as Israel's capital has become stronger thanks to government and Jewish initiatives. The Israeli government is pouring lots of resources into Jerusalem as a counterweight to al-Quds's status as the Palestinian capital. World Jewry are also participating in the efforts to emphasize Jerusalem's importance to the Jewish people. Numerous plans that had previously been left on paper now become reality — for example, the capital finally gets its speed train line to Tel Aviv via Ben-Gurion Airport.

Jerusalem has an Israeli-Palestinian seam that snakes from west to east and from south to north. This seam is of double significance: first, it separates the Jewish-Israeli neighborhoods from the Arab-Palestinian ones; second, it is the area in which the two populations encounter each other. At first the seam is characterized by uncertainty and apprehension. The residents of the Jewish neighborhoods in East Jerusalem fear not only that their Palestinian neighbors will snipe at them but also that Palestinians will steal their property and harass their young women and children.

Some of the Jewish neighborhoods decide to fence themselves off and have demanded that the Israeli government provide them with 24-hour a day security guards. On the second seam, that of encounter, there is fear of the special arrangements that govern the daily contact between the two populations. How will personal security be guaranteed? How the economic and financial arrangements ensure that business will be profitable and the labor market efficient? What bureaucratic agonies will each side need to undergo in order to guarantee its rights against injury or dispute with the other side?

Jerusalem and al-Quds are two cities in which police forces are highly visible. Unobtrusive oversight by plainclothes agents is not sufficient, nor are the observation posts and television cameras whose signals are sent into the joint operations room at the Jaffa Gate. The large number of policemen must provide for the psychological needs of the two populations and express with their uniforms the sovereignty of their countries.

Jerusalem and al-Quds do not have a hard border, but policemen from the joint Israeli-Palestinian unit patrol the seam. From time to time they erect unannounced roadblocks and seek out people suspected of criminal acts or of being in the city without a permit. This salient police presence tells thieves that there's a lacuna here, a problematic place. Checkpoints are scattered through the metropolitan area, meant to prevent the Jerusalem from becoming an uncontrolled entry point for people and goods into the hinterland of each country. Palestinian citizens and tourists are permitted to enter the rest of Israel only after producing an appropriate document. The same is true of an Israeli citizen who wants to enter Palestine via al-Quds. The residents of the former settlements that have now been annexed to Israel (Ma'aleh Adumim, Givat Ze'ev, and Gush Etzion) travel freely to and from Jerusalem on roads that are under Israeli sovereignty. Israelis who want to drive to Eilat via the northern Dead Sea, and to Tiberias via the Jordan Valley, can do so by paying a toll at the entry point and exit points from Palestinian territory.

Vision 2 from Menachem Klein, "Jerusalem: Constructive Division or Apartheid? In Dan Leon (ed.), **Who's Left in Israel? Radical Political Alternatives for the Future of Israel**, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press 2004, pp. 178-182.

Options for a divided city

The question is not whether Jerusalem will be divided but *how* it will be divided.

Once the options of a bi-national city, a shared city and an equal city had been removed from the agenda, there remained only the options which we will now discuss.

First, *unilateral partition*, in which the Palestinian side would be even further weakened, split up into a number of fragmented geographical enclaves or neighborhoods and lacking any form of political and community integration. It is hard to agree with the assumption that in the long run Israel can achieve its goal in this way. Apart from Jerusalem's centrality in Islam and in Palestinian nationalism, in the area where Israel wants to impose its rule, about ten percent of the overall population of the West Bank is living. The Palestinians, the Arabs and the Muslims will not permit Israel to do this and at a certain stage they will assist the residents of East Jerusalem to become an active force rather than passive subjects.

A rigid partition imposed through an impenetrable rigid wall as in Berlin until 1991, in Jerusalem from 1949 to 1967 or in Nicosia since 1974 would make the two parts of Jerusalem into borderline cities and bring about the deterioration of both of them.

Physical partition which creates not only a border but a multifaceted border regime facilitating frequent but controlled border crossing would be to the benefit of both parties.

The intention is not to two cities completely open to each other since this would mean placing the control points of the international border around and not between them. This would create a certain disconnection between the interior of the county and its capital. Were we not speaking of a capital city perhaps such a thing would be practical. Up to now, however, there has been no evidence that the ruling Israeli and Palestinian authorities are ready for this sort of arrangement, joining East and West Jerusalem at the expense of the links of each one with the hinterland in its own country. Moreover, as we have noted, this linkup would be forced and not natural. The 'faces' of West and East Jerusalem are not oriented to each other but to their ethnic hinterland. Consequently the reality demands drawing a clear border between West and East Jerusalem according to the principle laid down by President Clinton:

what is Arab is Palestinian, what is Jewish is Israeli. The delineation of the border will create a situation in which on both side the demographical reality will correspond with each party's authority, both effective and symbolical.

The border will be recognized both internationally and politically. The metropolis of East Jerusalem will be wholly open to its own natural hinterland. Roads will link the Arab neighborhoods to each other just as other roads will join the Jewish neighborhoods, while every citizen of Israel or Palestine will move freely within his/her sovereign state. In those places where the two parties make use of the same road like the French Hill junction or Road no 1, engineering solutions will be found.

Border crossings of different sorts will be built. Heavy traffic and busses will bring people and goods to terminals built at the entrances to the city near the bypass roads. As for private traffic, light vehicles and pedestrians, they will be able to cross at a series of border crossings, where a quick track will be built for Jerusalemites, enabling a quick and easy crossing for workers and business people. The border crossing will be along the seam line between Jerusalem and al-Kuds but on main roads rather than on narrow ones. A dynamic will be created between the two cities while at the same time neither the sovereignty of each party will be impaired nor their ability in certain cases to close the crossing. An international unit will supervise the implementation by the two sides of the crossing policy while in the event of any controversy between them, a mechanism to resolve differences will be established. It will be agreed to set up a border guard under international supervision, whose aim would be to prevent any neglect of the border area, it would also to prevent any use of the border area in a manner harmful to the other party through construction, pollution etc. The physical separation and border obstacles in areas reflecting the religious-historical 'bowl' of Jerusalem will be built with transparent material. The design and planning of the border will be opened by both parties to an international competition between architects and town planners.

While a roof municipality will not be established, there will be cooperation and coordination between the two municipalities. No settlers will remain living in Palestinian neighborhoods and special arrangements will be made for Holy Places of

one party which will be under the sovereignty of another. These will assure freedom of worship and freedom of access to believers and visitors, as well as the maintenance of these sites. The Jewish side will enjoy freedom of access to the Jewish cemetery on the Mount of Olives with security being upheld by Jewish police.

There is a possibility of maintaining the Old City as an open city without rigid fences separating the Jewish Quarter, which is under Jewish sovereignty, from the rest of the Quarters, which are under Palestinian sovereignty. Entrance to the Old City will be free, with control operating only in exiting from there. A special speeded up lane for Israelis will ensure them a quick exit. Palestinians and tourists who did not enter from Israeli territory will have to show a visa.

The Temple Mount, as it is known to the Jews, or al-Haram al-Sharif as it is known in Islam, and what the Jews call the Western Wall – constitute one unit in Judaism and in Islam. The controversy over sovereignty must take this into account. There are, therefore, only two possibilities. The first is to grant no political sovereignty over the Holy site. There would be no Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount and Israel would withdraw its sovereignty over the Western Wall. In this case, the administration, but not the sovereignty, would be in the hands of the two parties. Alternatively, the sovereignty would be divided in such a way that the Temple Mount would be under Israeli sovereignty and the prayer area of the Western Wall would be under Palestinian sovereignty. Under both alternatives, not damaging Jewish interests on the Temple Mount would be secured through a representative international presence. The first option is more difficult to implement because it takes away from Israel something that absolutely belonged to it, and prevents the Palestinians from getting something that was not theirs. As for the second option, it denies Israel of only symbolic sovereignty, while meeting Jewish-Israeli interests.

Three stages

No arrangement can be made without it being preceded by an interim period. This can be broken down into three stages in accordance with the 'Road Map' which has been proposed by the Quartet.

In the first stage there will be a freezing of the building of Israeli settlements within Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem. The entry of settlers into the residential areas which they had acquired in the private market, would be forbidden. House demolition by Israel in East Jerusalem would be stopped. Also, there would be a building freeze in those sections relating to East Jerusalem in the master plan which Israel is preparing. Israel would cease the unilateral construction of the fence and the wall. The struggle against terror would be conducted through cooperation with the Palestinian security forces, following the return of the representatives of these forces to function in Jerusalem. This would be carried out in the framework of the same unofficial arrangements which pertained in Jerusalem until summer 2000. The two parties would be assisted by a special international force which would operate in the Jewish-Arab seam area alongside the two security forces.

Personal and public security will be restored to East Jerusalem through community involvement. Thus the boycott of identity cards for East Jerusalemites which Israel has imposed since 1996 would end and the identity cards would be returned to their owners. All the unilateral archeological excavations in particularly sensitive areas like the Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif and its environs, would be halted immediately. Concerning services like the issue of passports and other documents by the Ministry of the Interior and the National Insurance which the Israeli authorities provide to Palestinians in East Jerusalem, these procedures would be completely overhauled and vastly improved. The Palestinian institutions which Israel closed would be reopened and their proper and uninterrupted functioning assured. The two parties would encourage the development of the private sector and of civic social Palestinian institutions. The aim would be to transfer authority from the Jerusalem municipality to the Palestine collective's administrative and representative institutions, including the relevant budgetary allocations. This could be operated either on a neighborhood or on a functional basis.

Freedom of political organization and activity would be assured in East Jerusalem. Insofar as national elections would be held in the Palestinian territories, they would also be held in East Jerusalem in the same framework as those held in 1996. The two parties would declare their intention to reach a two-state solution in Mandatory

Palestine, with their capitals in Jerusalem. Freedom of access to the whole Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif area would be assured as it was on the eve of the Intifada in the year 2000.

In the second stage, the processes of strengthening the Palestinian party and developing its overall potential, which had been started in the first state, would be intensified. Comprehensive authority in urban affairs, including planning and construction, would be transferred to the Palestinian factors, and so would additional budgets. The Palestinian public and urban administration would be extended. Special efforts would be invested in the encouragement of investors and donors from abroad so as to improve the infrastructure and develop projects in East Jerusalem. Elected representatives of the Palestinian Parliament would be permitted to function in East Jerusalem.

In the third stage, the juridical-political framework for the permanent settlement in Jerusalem would be shaped. At this stage all the mutual demands of the parties would be terminated. The authorities of the Palestinian state would officially replace the Israeli authorities in the Eastern part of the city. The Palestinian Municipal Authority would commence to function officially and with full authority and elections to its institutions would be held. A body connecting and coordinating between the two municipalities would be established in order as far as possible to prevent damage caused by any party to the other, and to promote subjects of importance to both. Examples of such subjects would include preservation and rehabilitation, highrise building and the quality of the environment. Cooperation between the two police forces and the security services of the parties would be strengthened in order to solve local problems, including those likely to arise on special occasions. like mass pilgrimages to the Holy Places.